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5Preface
Preface 
Many countries face shortages of skilled workers and high youth unemployment. In the 
process of reforming their vocational education systems, a significant number of these 
countries have turned their attention to the potential offered by dual apprenticeships. The 
basic principle behind this approach is that young people receive in-company training 
and a school-based education at the same time. Any reform to implement this type of 
apprenticeship depends heavily on the willingness of companies to provide training. But 
which conditions make it economically worthwhile for companies to engage in apprenticeship 
training? This question is arising in countries that are considering introducing an 
apprenticeship training model, and also in those with existing dual apprenticeship systems. 
In recent years, the education economists Prof. Dr. Stefan C. Wolter and Prof. Dr. Samuel 
Mühlemann have conducted several country studies examining how the costs and benefits 
of training vary from the point of view of companies under different policy contexts. In 
these studies, they analyse the effects of various aspects of dual apprenticeship systems, 
such as the duration of training, the remuneration of apprentices or the relationship 
between theory and practice on costs and benefits. The constant challenge is to guarantee 
high-quality training and to make training attractive from a company perspective. 
In this report, Stefan Wolter and Samuel Mühlemann have articulated general conclusions 
drawing from the cross-country comparisons. General conclusions are not to be applied 
as a blueprint for every country. However, they provide important and generalizable 
information for the design of apprenticeship training models. And they can serve as a 
stimulus to initiate cost-benefit studies for further countries.
We are convinced that apprenticeship training offers an immense amount of value, and 
not just for companies – for young people’s prospects and the economy as a whole. We 
would therefore like to thank Stefan Wolter and Samuel Mühlemann for deriving these 
concise lessons learned. We hope that this will help steer policymakers and employers into 
more evidence-based directions and to promote the dissemination of dual apprenticeship 
training models.
Hang Ho
Head of Philanthropy for Europe, 
Middle East, Africa and Latin America
J.P. Morgan
Clemens Wieland
Senior Expert, Learning for Life Program
Bertelsmann Stiftung
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Introduction 
This text summarises the seven most important findings that have been gleaned using 
detailed cost-benefit surveys of apprenticeship training programmes in various countries 
and subsequent cost-benefit simulations for other countries over the last 20 years. The 
costs incurred by the firms providing training were measured, as were the benefits they can 
generate in the short term through the apprentices’ work in the company and the medium-
term benefits obtained because apprenticeship programs help companies avoid costly 
recruitment from the labour market. 
These surveys and simulations mainly concern European countries. However, they have also 
been applied to non-European countries.1 Specifically, the following statements refer to 
cost-benefit surveys from Switzerland, Germany and Austria and cost-benefit simulations 
run for England, Italy and Spain. The cost-benefit measurements in the three German-
speaking countries were also used for comparative studies, i.e. studies that investigated the 
causes and effects of the differences in the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in 
the three countries (see point 2). The findings we draw from the cost-benefit measurements 
and the corresponding simulations are summarized in seven lessons: 
1)  Ratio of costs and benefits influences firms‘ willingness of providing apprenticeship 
training
2) Similar apprenticeship training systems do not necessarily produce similar outcomes
3) Returns on apprenticeships after training are maybe more important than during
4)  Flexible but coherent training parameters are key for a functioning apprenticeship 
training system
5) Variable apprentices’ salaries prevent distortions in the apprenticeship market 
6)  Apprentices‘ benefits are a relevant factor that must also be considered for a 
functioning apprenticeship system
7) Training quality and scope may reduce net costs and increase the returns on education
The first three lessons refer almost exclusively to the actual measurements of the costs and 
benefits of apprentice training, while the lessons 4-7 can be derived mainly from findings 
from the simulations.
1 The cost-benefit survey instrument from Switzerland was also used to measure the costs and benefits of the 
SkillsFuture Earn and Learn Programme (ELP) in Singapore (see Renold et al. 2018).
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1 |   Ratio of costs and benefits influences firms‘ 
willingness of providing apprenticeship 
training
The fact that firms weigh the costs and benefits of training based on economic calculations 
and only offer training places if the result is positive for them is an idea that has a robust 
position in economic theory. However, in the discussions about why certain firms had active 
apprenticeship programs and others did not, economic arguments were not only missing 
for a long time, but their importance in training decisions was categorically negated by 
practitioners, some academic disciplines and sometimes even politicians. Yet, economists 
would not claim that economic advantages are the only motive for training decisions, nor 
would they claim that it is the most important argument for or against training. Economists 
only offered a ceteris paribus: if everything else is equal, and two firms are identical in 
everything but the costs and benefits of training, a firm for which the benefits of training 
outweigh the costs would train and a firm for which the benefits are smaller than the costs 
would forego it. The forms of benefit that can arise from training did not play a role in this 
theoretical argument for the time being. 
In order for this idea to not just remain theoretical, but to empirically prove its relevance 
in practice, it was necessary to measure the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training 
for as many firms as possible, since not only the firms differ, but one can also assume 
that training in a specific apprenticeship occupation – regardless of the firm – cannot be 
compared with the costs and benefits of an apprenticeship in another occupation. Cost-
benefit analysis therefore had to be carried out across the board for a huge number of firms 
and occupations in order to obtain conclusive findings. However, measurements including 
the benefits had only been conceived in Germany towards the end of the 1980s, prior to that 
only costs were measured. Furthermore, the simultaneous measurement of the cost-benefit 
for 2000 firms without apprenticeships in Germany and Switzerland were surveyed for the 
first time.2 Only the latter made it possible to say anything at all about the significance 
of costs and benefits for the firms providing apprenticeships. If one merely observed 
companies with apprenticeship programs, one could not know which factors were actually 
decisive without the contrasting image of non-training firms.
For the first time, these data now made it possible to show that firms training apprentices 
had a much better average cost-benefit ratio, i.e. an average net benefit after training that 
was higher than the estimated average cost-benefit ratio of a non-training firm (Wolter et 
al. 2006). Furthermore, it could be shown that the cost-benefit ratio of training is decisive 
not only if a firm trains apprentices or not, but for how many apprentices a firm trains 
2 Mühlemann and Wolter (2014) provide an overview of cost-benefit measurements and selected findings 
across OECD countries and Wolter and Ryan (2011) provide an extensive overview of the theoretical and 
empirical literature in economics on apprenticeship training.
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(Mühlemann et al. 2007). However, the data not only enabled static comparisons to be made 
between enterprises that provide vocational training and those that do not. In addition, it 
was possible to test whether firms offer more training places or fewer, depending on the 
changing market conditions that influence the costs and benefits. These analyses primarily 
used geographical variations in the number of competitors in their own local labour market 
as influencing factors. If the number of competitors decreases, then not only will the 
number of firms that could poach self-trained skilled workers at the end of their training 
decline (Mühlemann and Wolter 2011), but in extreme cases, if you are essentially the only 
employer in a particular occupation (Monopsony), you can also reduce costs during the 
apprenticeship because you can reduce the apprentice‘s wages (Mühlemann et al. 2013). 
These analyses show that if the conditions on the local labour market allow a firm to achieve 
a more favourable cost-benefit ratio, the willingness of the firms to train also increases. As 
previously claimed, if these factors are not decisive for the training decision, no differences 
in the willingness to train could be expected with different cost-benefit ratios. This view 
was refuted.
Interestingly, the fact that the importance of economic factors for training decisions was 
downplayed both in science and some commercial sectors did not prevent politicians or 
entrepreneurs from demanding state funding to support firms‘ willingness to train. In 
many countries, firms with apprenticeships are supported by subsidies, either financed 
directly by taxpayers‘ or collected from all firms through fees. The latter is also justified 
by the fact that it enables (economic) solidarity between firms that offer apprenticeships 
and firms that do not train apprentices themselves. In addition to subsidies, there are 
other ways of positively influencing firms in their training decisions, for example by 
awarding public contracts to firms with apprenticeships. This, too, is an economic incentive 
designed to encourage firms to invest more in training, because without apprenticeships 
they would lose public contracts and lose money. In an analysis of the effect of such an 
incentive, Strupler and Wolter (2017) were able to show that it is possible to persuade small 
firms in particular to provide training, which shows that firms are guided by economic 
considerations when considering whether or not to offer training places. 
FIRST LESSON  The existing empirical evidence clearly shows that the ratio of costs 
and benefits of apprenticeship training both positively and negatively influences the 
willingness of firms to train. 
Again – as is usual with economic arguments – this is a ceteris paribus argument, i.e. 
economic facts are not posited as the only or even the most important reason for or against 
apprenticeships, if everything else is the same, then the cost-benefit ratio of training is 
decisive for whether a firm offers apprenticeships or not. 
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2 |   Similar apprenticeship training systems do 
not necessarily produce similar outcomes
The comparisons of the costs and benefits of companies in Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland were somewhat surprising. From external perspective, the assumption 
had been that these vocational training systems were so similar that the cost-benefit 
ratios of apprenticeship training would have to be similar in the three countries. Initial 
comparisons between Switzerland and Germany (see Dionisius et al. 2009; Mühlemann et 
al. 2010) showed that comparable Swiss firms achieved on average a net benefit at the end 
of training, while German firms had to reckon with net costs. These differences indicated 
that German firms could expect a benefit after the end of training on apprentices they had 
trained themselves, which the Swiss firms could not hope for, otherwise German firms 
would not have provided training under these conditions. The next question that arose was 
why Swiss firms using a similar vocational training system were able to achieve a net benefit 
and German firms were not. A detailed examination of the individual components of the 
costs and benefits of apprenticeship training revealed that the time spent by apprentices in 
productive activities reveals this difference. Unlike in Switzerland, in Germany companies 
employed apprentices in tasks that were – from the point of view of the firm – economically 
unproductive in the short term. Interestingly enough, when it comes to quality of training 
outcomes from the surveyed businesses’ perspective, employment in demanding productive 
activities imparts more competences than merely practicing activities (see also lesson 3). 
Finally, the comparison with Austria showed that Austrian firms, like German firms, ended 
the training period with net costs. But it is a mistake to assume that the reasons for the 
net costs compared with the Swiss companies could also be attributed to factors similar 
to the German-Swiss comparison. In contrast to Swiss firms, the net costs of Austrian 
firms are explained almost exclusively by significantly higher wages for apprentices in 
relationship to the wages of skilled workers (see Moretti et al. 2019). First, the relatively 
high apprenticeship wages can be explained by the fact that the competition between 
apprenticeships in firms and full-time school-based vocational training is immensely 
stronger in Austria than in Switzerland. In Austria only a minority of students in vocational 
education and training are in apprenticeships, in Switzerland the situation is exactly the 
opposite. In order to attract young learners, firms with apprenticeship programs try to 
create an incentive with high wages that Swiss firms do not need. Secondly, the payment 
of higher wages is encouraged by the state subsidies for apprentices‘ wages, which also 
compensates for part of the short-term costs incurred by the firm.
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SECOND LESSON  Countries whose vocational training system look similar at a 
systemic level do not necessarily produce similar results in economic reality. 
The consequences of this are twofold: First, in order to understand the actions of firms, one 
must not only consider the vocational training system, but also other parts of the political 
environment in the country like the educational system, labour market regulations, social 
partnership regulations and the willingness of the state to intervene in the training market by 
offering subsidies. Secondly, the large differences between the German-speaking countries 
also mean that when a vocational training system is transferred to another country (e. g. for 
the simulations that have been made), the outcome may be quite different, depending on the 
country chosen as a model.
3 |   Returns on apprenticeships after training 
are maybe more important than during
Firms that train apprentices can economically justify these investments either because the 
apprentice‘s work during the apprenticeship training already covers these investments, i.e. 
there are no net costs at the end of the apprenticeship training, or, if there are uncovered 
investments, there is a benefit after the apprenticeship training that justifies these net 
costs. For both Austrian and German firms offering apprenticeship programs, net costs are 
incurred on average at the end of the training period (see lesson 2). Additionally, the cost-
benefit surveys in Switzerland showed that although the majority of firms with apprentices 
broke even at the end of training, one third of the firms with apprenticeship programs still 
have net costs, i.e. they depend on a benefit after the apprenticeship training to cover these 
costs. In contrast to the detailed data on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training 
during the apprenticeship training, for a long time there was blind spot with regard to any 
post-apprenticeship benefits that may accrue. In addition, not all firms can rely on such a 
benefit; otherwise all firms would be prepared to incur net costs during the apprenticeship 
training. In other words, there must be some firms that can still achieve very great benefits 
with their apprenticeship training after the apprenticeship, so they accept net costs, while 
there are other firms that do not expect such additional benefits so they are therefore not 
prepared to provide apprenticeship training that incurs net costs.
Although the benefits of apprenticeship training can take many forms, the most striking 
benefit is that when a firm trains apprentices itself, it can avoid subsequent recruitment 
and onboarding costs. Firms that do not train apprentices must meet their skilled labour 
needs by recruiting skilled workers who have already been trained, and this can result 
in high recruitment and induction costs that could be avoided by training apprentices. 
Assuming that the firms with apprenticeship programs can retain all or at least some of 
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their apprentices, a question arises for firms: Can the avoidable recruitment and induction 
costs be high enough to justify substantial net training costs?
Our studies of these hiring costs for skilled workers show (see Blatter et al. 2016) that both 
an increase in these avoidable hiring costs and an increase in the net costs of training have 
an influence on firms‘ willingness to provide apprenticeship training. Hiring costs increase 
the willingness to provide apprenticeship training and training costs reduce the willingness 
to provide apprenticeship training. This would be true if the net costs of training and the 
hiring costs that were saved develop independently of one another. In reality, this is not 
the case because firms that cannot expect large savings in recruitment can only train if 
they can achieve a net benefit during training and vice versa, firms that save recruitment 
investments are more willing to invest on training. Basically, one can imagine four types of 
firms with different training behaviour outcomes: 
(1)  Firms with net benefits and low hiring costs train because with a net benefit there is no 
need to look for benefit after the apprenticeship training.
(2)  Firms with net benefits and high hiring costs train apprentices anyway, since they can 
potentially benefit twice. 
(3)  For firms with net costs during training and high recruitment costs the situation is 
different: Here, firms train apprentices despite the net costs if hiring costs surpass 
training costs, but they may refrain from training if the training costs exceed hiring 
costs.
(4)  Firms with net costs during training but low recruitment costs will forego training in all 
cases. 
FIGURE 1   Propensity to train apprentices depending on the combination of net costs 
(benefits) and hiring costs of skilled workers of firms
hiring costs low hiring costs high
net costs very low not clear
net benefit high very high
Whereas some factors explaining why some firms can expect high savings in recruitment 
and induction costs and others cannot are related to either the business cycle or the 
industry-specific situation on the labour market (see Mühlemann and Strupler 2018), 
institutional arrangements, like labour market regulations are also important when 
explaining differences between countries. Highly regulated labour markets, where firms 
cannot easily dismiss workers also limit the possibilities for apprentices to find jobs 
elsewhere after the training. This in turn protects the investments of the firms with 
apprenticeship programs because they can keep wages below the marginal productivity of 
workers and thereby create a post-apprenticeship benefit without exposing their trained 
workers to the risk of being poached by competitors. The significance of such labour market 
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regulations for the cost-benefit situation during training could be analysed based on the 
Hartz reforms in Germany (see Jansen et al. 2015). The results show that German firms with 
apprenticeship programs reacted to liberalisation by adopting training policies that came 
closer to the Swiss variant, i.e. they significantly reduced the net costs of training. They did 
this by making apprentices work more, spending less time with unproductive exercises. In 
the eyes of the German firms with apprenticeship programs, this change from exercises to 
real work was also associated with an increase in the productivity of the learners; in other 
words, the apprentices seemed to learn more by working than they did doing exercises.
THIRD LESSON  The long-term economic benefits that firms can derive from 
apprentices after they become employees may be more important for the decision to 
train apprentices than the short-term consideration of the cost-benefit ratio at the 
end of training. 
However, certain conditions must be met so that firms can rely on the benefits after the 
apprenticeship so they are prepared to accept net costs during the apprenticeship. This 
includes protection of training investments against competitors, which can either be legal 
(labour market regulations, social partnership agreements) or economic, e. g. protection 
against the closest competitor through geographical distance. This also means that the 
firms with apprenticeship programs must also be large enough to be able to offer their 
apprentices attractive opportunities for further employment in an internal labour market. 
All this suggests that small and very small firms must be able to rely on a net benefit during 
the apprenticeship so that they can afford training programs. Additionally, a country must 
be prepared to accept the sometimes negative side effects of labour market regulations 
and associated conflicts if it cannot offer a sufficiently large number of companies the 
opportunity to break even during the apprenticeship.
4 |   Flexible but coherent training parameters 
are key for a functioning apprenticeship 
training system
From the observations made so far, it can be construed that firms are prepared to provide 
apprenticeship positions under various conditions and that there is not simply a single 
possible model of apprenticeship training. However, this does not mean that apprenticeship 
training is worthwhile for firms in every constellation of factors and parameters. The 
importance of the coherence or consistency of the combination of parameters of the 
training models can be best illustrated with some examples from our simulation studies. In 
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all cost-benefit simulations, the Swiss training model was transferred to other countries by 
transferring the training choices made by Swiss firms in the occupation under consideration 
(e. g. the number of teaching hours in the firm and the development of the productivity of 
apprentices relative to skilled workers) to the realities of the labour market of the country 
for which the simulations were carried out (represented by absolute and relative wages in 
the various occupational categories). Only the recruitment costs could not be simulated, 
these had to be determined directly by interviewing firms in the country concerned. The 
advantage of simulations lies in the fact that various parameters of the training model can 
be changed and one can thus estimate – given certain assumptions – the effects of these 
parameters on the cost-benefit ratios of the potential training firms. The two selected 
examples come from the cost-benefit simulations for Spain (Wolter and Mühlemann 2015; 
Mühlemann and Wolter 2017). 
The first example concerns the duration of training. In most systems, the duration of 
training is determined by the state and can rarely be determined individually by the firms. 
In some countries the state decides after consultation with the employers, in others the 
state decrees the duration without consulting the employers and, depending on the system, 
the state has a uniform duration for all training or allows different lengths of training 
depending on the occupation. Even if it is common in the general education systems 
for educational courses to have standardized lengths (bachelor‘s or master‘s degrees) 
regardless of the field of study, this policy cannot simply be transferred to vocational 
training, where individual occupations require very different amounts of time for an 
apprentice to become productive and where companies invest very different amounts of 
time and money for an apprentice to reach a certain level of competence. The only standard 
TABLE 1   Net-cost simulations for Spain; three different training models and two different scenarios for 
apprentices’ salaries 
€300 €530
Occupation M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 HC
Laboratory technician 5,672 6,619 –285 13,952 12,139 7,995
Plant technician (chemical in.) –6,742 –2,483 –12,319 1,538 3,037 –4,039
Automobile expert 32 1,492 –5,380 8,312 7,012 2,900
Electromechanical technician 3,735 5,064 779 12,015 10,584 9,059
Bank clerk –370 4,112 –4,165 7,910 9,632 4,115
Store clerk –3,258 –332 –8,388 5,022 5,188 –108
Retail sales expert –2,501 –132 –7,597 5,779 5,388 683
Technician in food industry –5,752 –502 –9,842 2,528 5,018 –1,562
Hotel management specialist –7,956 –2,689 –13,047 324 2,831 –4,767
Cook in hotels and restaurants –2,392 871 –6,173 5,888 6,391 2,107
Source: Wolter and Mühlemann, 2015 (Table 12, p. 75): M1, M2 and M3 denote the different training models for which simulations were 
made and HC stands for the hiring costs saved on the external labour market. M1 resembles the Swiss training model for youth leaving 
lower-secondary education and lasts 3 years; M2 is a two-year training program for youth with an upper-secondary qualification and M3 is 
an extension of M2 by one additional year of training. 
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is the relative productivity that an apprentice must have attained at the end of training 
relative to a skilled worker in the relevant occupation. This should be the same everywhere, 
so that a transition into the occupation is guaranteed. On the other hand, the time and 
investment necessary to reach this point can vary greatly from one occupation to another. 
However, if the state sets uniform lengths for all apprenticeships, these may be set too long 
in individual occupations, i.e. apprentices would learn the necessary skills more quickly and 
in other cases they are set too short, i.e. apprentices find it difficult to learn the required 
skills in the time available. In the first case, firms with apprenticeship programs can now 
achieve a high net benefit because they can employ the apprentices „too long“ as trainees 
at a low apprentice‘s wage while they are already very productive. In the second case, the 
apprentice would be of little use because of his low productivity and the company would 
have to invest a lot of time and money in the training in order to achieve the required level 
of competence in the short time required, so that the training can only be completed with 
very high net costs. 
This can be very nicely illustrated in the case of the simulations for Spain. In Spain, the 
government has set a uniform length of 2 years for all apprenticeships. This corresponds 
to the results for model 2 in Table 1. If one simulates the net costs for a Spanish firm under 
the assumption that it would train apprentices in a similar way to a Swiss firm, then even in 
the scenario with low apprentice wages (300 euros per month) for three occupations quite 
high net costs would be incurred by the end of the apprenticeship (laboratory technician, 
electromechanical technician and bank clerk; results highlighted in red), while in the 
other occupations the two-year apprenticeship would be sufficient for an average firm 
to break even. If these apprenticeships were extended to three years (model 3), it would 
be possible to break even in all occupations paying a low apprentice‘s wage and in those 
occupations that already reached break-even after two years, it would also be possible to 
pay an apprentice‘s wage of 530 euros instead of 300 euros. This would lead to a trade-off of 
a longer apprenticeship period with a higher apprentice wage or a shorter apprenticeship 
period with a lower apprentice wage (see lesson 6). In other words, in a scenario with 
low apprenticeship wages, the simulation results argue against dictating uniform 
apprenticeship durations, since these are too short for certain occupations in the case of 
two years (as defined in Spain) and would be too long for many occupations in the case of a 
three-year duration for all occupations. 
The second example concerns the interaction between net costs during training 
and the savings in recruitment costs after apprenticeship (see lesson 3). As already 
explained, not all firms or occupations have to be able to show a net benefit at the end 
of the apprenticeship to justify training costs, since there may be a benefit after the 
apprenticeship. This potential benefit after the apprenticeship is illustrated in Table 1 in 
the column (HC). Red was used for occupations in which the labour market in Spain at 
the time of the simulations was described by the companies as ‘a firm could find skilled 
workers who had already been trained on the external labour market with relatively little 
effort’. Light green was used for those occupations for which the firms indicated that it was 
not only costly to find trained skilled workers, but that skilled workers already trained by 
other firms with relatively high adjustment costs for the activities in their company still 
had to be qualified. The two situations must now be interpreted in such a way that in the 
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red cases, where no major additional benefit was to be expected due to low recruitment 
costs, the firms would have to be able to achieve a net benefit during the apprenticeship 
to make the training worthwhile, while in the green cases certain net costs during the 
apprenticeship could be justified by a benefit after the apprenticeship. The comparison of 
the simulated net costs with the recruitment costs (HC) expected by the firms now shows 
that 9 out of 10 simulated occupations resulted in a coherent combination of net costs and 
recruitment costs. Cases with high net costs, e. g. the laboratory technician, showed high 
returns due to saved recruitment costs and cases where no great benefit was to be expected 
after the apprenticeship, e. g. in the case of the hotel management specialist, most cost-
benefit simulations during the apprenticeship lead to a net benefit, i.e. these firms are not 
dependent on a benefit after the apprenticeship. In one case, however, the situation of the 
net costs during the apprenticeship and the potential additional benefits to be expected 
after the apprenticeship do not fit together. In the case of the bank clerks, only one net 
cost simulation leads to a net benefit during the apprenticeship and at the same time the 
labour market situation seems to be such that the banks do not expect a large additional 
benefit after the apprenticeship. Thus, the firms are in the uncomfortable situation that 
training is not worthwhile even in the long run, which is why they prefer to hope that other 
firms or the state (universities) will conduct training and that these specialists can then be 
hired. In view of this situation, banks would need training parameters, such as even lower 
apprentice salaries or an even longer training period, so that the costs would work out for 
the employers in the long term. 
FOURTH LESSON  Different combinations of the parameters relevant for the cost-
benefit ratio are possible and flexibility is key to adapt to the different economic 
realities of firms. However, this should not be confused with the idea that every 
combination of parameters leads to a favourable outcome. 
All parameters, such as duration of training, apprentices‘ wages (see lesson 5), expectations of 
apprentices‘ competences and many more that have an influence on the costs and benefits of 
training from the firms‘ point of view, must first be handled as flexibly as possible because the 
economic reality is not the same for every firm. However, the combination of the individual 
parameters must be coherent. In other words, although there is no such thing as a one-
size-fits-all model of apprenticeship training that meets the needs of all companies actively 
involved in training in a wide variety of occupations, this does not mean that individual 
parameters of training can be determined and changed at will, because they must be 
coherent in both their entirety and interaction in order to guarantee cost-effective training. 
There is neither a one-size-fits-all nor an everything goes solution.
16
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5 |   Variable apprentices’ salaries prevent 
distortions in the apprenticeship market
If one looks at the main determinants of the costs of apprenticeship training, then 
apprenticeship wages are the largest single cost. In Switzerland, apprenticeship wages 
generally account for between 40 and 50 % of the gross costs of apprenticeship training.  
It is not surprising that wages are one of the most important questions when analysing 
the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training. Considering the question of determining 
the wage level from the firms’ perspective, one would assume that apprenticeship wages 
are set as a function of the remaining costs and benefits. Thus, the wage used would either 
guarantee that a firm’s apprentice program breaks even at the end of the apprenticeship or 
that the firm incurs a justifiable level of net costs, which it hopes to compensate through 
benefits garnered after the apprenticeship. This wage would be the wage offer and whether 
the firm will get apprentices with this wage or not would depend on the labour market for 
apprentices, because if there were other firms paying a higher wage, the firm might not 
find any apprentices at all. If the quality of the training were consistent, the competition 
between firms over wages would also lead to the apprentices being trained in firms where 
they would provide the greatest economic benefit. In reality, in many countries the variable 
apprenticeship wage is not determined according to market considerations, but by a 
fixed wage, which is decided either by the state (e. g. minimum wages for young people) 
or negotiated between the social partners. Consequently, neither the company’s initial 
situation nor whether the apprentice‘s salary is justified by the apprentice‘s contribution 
are considered. This exogenously fixed wage can therefore be far too low, which allows 
the firms providing apprenticeships to achieve large net benefits or – and this is the more 
frequent case – too high, which discourages too many firms from providing training. 
In the case of fixed apprenticeship wages, a further distinction can be made between 
two forms of wage levels, namely an absolute wage level and setting a relative value to a 
comparative wage, usually the wage earned by a trained skilled worker in the occupation 
to be trained. The second version, namely the relative level based on a reference wage, can 
also be oriented either on the real wage paid by the training company to its skilled workers 
or – much more frequently – on an average wage paid for this category of skilled workers 
across the entire sector. While the determination of wages as an absolute value takes no 
wage differences between sectors, occupations, regions or company sizes into account, the 
relative apprentice wage at least has the advantage that it considers the huge differences in 
the wages of skilled workers between individual occupations, which can be observed in all 
countries. 
In all simulations we did, for the countries England, Italy and Spain, ex ante fixed wages 
had to be used, since in all three countries either minimum youth wages or fixed wages for 
apprenticeship training had to be taken into account (Wolter and Joho 2018; Mühlemann, 
Wolter and Joho 2018; Wolter and Mühlemann 2015). Therefore, we included wages as fixed 
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variables in the simulations and, depending on these wages, calculated the net costs or 
net benefits of apprenticeship training for the selected occupations in all cases. However, 
as a complement, we also estimated the apprentice wages as the outcome of the net cost 
calculations, i.e. what wages the firms would be able to pay if their goal was to have no net 
costs at the end of the training period. These wages could then be compared with those 
previously set. In those cases where these wages were above the minimum wages, the 
potential scope of increasing salaries in order to attract potential apprentices was becoming 
evident, and in the other cases where the break-even compatible apprentice wage was lower 
than the prescribed minimum wage, it was possible to estimate how far wages would have 
to be lowered in order to attract a sufficient number of firms to conduct training.
If the apprenticeship wages cannot be determined by the firms themselves, but are given 
exogenously as absolute or relative wages, then the firms only have the possibility to 
decide whether they train or not depending on these wages. If there is only this possibility 
to react, the consequences for a vocational training system would be quantitative, namely 
how many companies are willing to train or not, and depending on the determination of 
wage levels there would still be a distribution effect, because certain regions, branches or 
companies could live better on those wages than others. All in all, the consequences would 
be manageable. Unfortunately, in most cases there may be other consequences, particularly 
if the expected quality of training is difficult to monitor. This would provide firms with 
the opportunity to influence the net costs of training by changing other cost parameters 
as a function of apprentice wages. In plain language, if the quality of training can only be 
observed approximately and poor quality of training is only inadequately punished, firms 
willing to provide training will react to exogenously excessively high apprentice salaries 
by reducing the other cost blocks. Since the other costs, the wages for the trainers, the 
expenses for training material, the time for training activities, etc., all have a negative 
influence on the quality of training; the danger is that apprentices will unintentionally 
exchange high apprentice salaries for low training quality.
In a simulation using Italian data, we examined by how much the net costs of firms with 
apprenticeship programs could be reduced if they were to respond to the high prescribed 
apprentice wages by reducing their training inputs (see Table 2). These simulations 
took into account the fact that if firms were to reduce their investment in training, the 
productivity of apprentices would also suffer, i.e. not only the costs, but also the benefits 
of training might be reduced. Despite the effect of reduced investment in training on the 
benefit of training, it was shown that substantial savings in net costs could be achieved for 
all occupations, and in one case net benefits could even be generated. This does not mean 
that all firms react this way to excessively high apprenticeship wages – as mentioned above, 
many firms are more likely to simply forego training altogether – but the simulations show 
that excessively high apprenticeship wages can be an incentive for individual firms to 
reduce the quality of training and that the quality and attractiveness of the entire system 
can thus be jeopardised.
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Source: Muehlemann et al., 2018 (Figure 10, page 46)
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FIGURE 2   Net costs simulations for different scenarios of training intensity in the firm for Italy3 
3
FIFTH LESSON  Fixing apprentice wages, in absolute or relative terms, i. e. not 
determining wages by evaluating the influence of market forces, will almost always 
lead to distortions in the apprenticeship market. 
Such distortions can affect the willingness to train in general, but they can also hinder training 
in individual sectors, for certain occupations, for individual types of firms (e. g. SMEs) or 
entire regions. If the quality of training is ensured, there are no obvious reasons to deviate 
from the determination of wages by companies (individually or collectively). If, on the other 
hand, there is no functioning guarantee of training quality, then wages fixed by the state or 
social partners will not help either; on the contrary, they can lead to even worse training 
quality.
3 Simulation 1 corresponds to the baseline simulation with ex ante fixed apprentices’ salaries. Simulation 2 is a 
scenario in which firms would react to the high net costs by deciding not to provide training at the workplace 
and therefore also dispense with any training time. However, due to reducing the training at the workplace, 
we have to further assume that the relative productivity of apprentices is 50 % of the relative productivity 
used in Simulation 1. Simulation 3 additionally assumes that while at the workplace, apprentices spend 
all their time doing simple tasks that are usually allocated to unskilled employees. The firms realize that 
the progress and the levels of productivity of the apprentices (assumptions in Simulation 2) are too low to 
generate a satisfactory added value when doing skilled work, and therefore decide to only use the apprentices 
to substitute for unskilled labour.
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So far, the focus has exclusively been on the net cost consideration from the firms’ 
point of view. This limited perspective can be explained by the fact that there can be no 
apprenticeship training unless firms offer apprenticeships. In other words, it is of no 
use for the other parties involved, the students and the state (or society) to optimise the 
conditions first if no firms are willing to train under these conditions afterwards. However, 
at the end of the day, the firms cannot train if they cannot find any apprentices or only 
insufficiently talented young people are willing to do an apprenticeship, which means that 
apprenticeship wages and training offers that would give the firms a net benefit, but which 
are not attractive enough to the young people, do not lead to a functioning apprenticeship 
market.
In the end, the training must be equally attractive for both the firms and the young people. 
So, in the simulations for England, we simulated not only the net costs for the firms but 
also the returns on education for the young people. In the case of the latter, it was assumed 
that they would start their training at the earliest possible age, after successful completion 
they would earn the average salary of a qualified skilled worker in the occupation they had 
learnt, as currently paid on the English labour market, and finally that they would receive 
an apprentice‘s wage during their apprenticeship that was calculated to guarantee that 
firms with apprenticeship programs can break even at the end of the training period. Table 
3 shows the simulated returns on education for young people. Returns below 5 %, i.e. below 
the normal time preference for people, can be described as insufficient. This means in these 
cases not enough young people can be expected to apply for an apprenticeship, or that those 
who would apply would be unsuitable candidates in terms of talent and motivation. As a 
result of unsuitable candidates, the calculated net costs for the companies would increase 
(because of the lower productivity of these apprentices and the higher number of training 
hours needed), which in turn would result in lower apprentice salaries and thus lower 
returns on education. A vicious circle.
As can be seen from Table 3, there are some occupations for which very high returns on 
education have been calculated, i.e. apprenticeship training that promises positive returns 
for both firms and apprentices and represents a win-win situation. However, there are 
also occupations with very low returns on education and even two occupations (retail 
cashiers and waitresses and waiters) for which no training model could be simulated that 
would generate an acceptable average return on education for the apprentices, assuming 
that at the end of the training period the firms would have covered their investments with 
a benefit. One way out (see lesson 7) of such a situation would only offer a higher skill 
premium in those occupations with such low returns on education. 
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SIXTH LESSON  Although the firms offer apprenticeships in which the cost-benefit 
ratio is right for them, there will still be no functioning apprenticeship system if the 
cost-benefit ratio (the return on education) for the students is not right as well. 
In consequence, in order to achieve a win-win situation for firms and apprentices, it 
must be possible to guarantee more than just an absence of net costs for the firms with 
apprenticeship programs.
TABLE 2   Rates of return on education, assuming break-even apprentices‘ salaries; 
England
Occupations Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Bricklayers 19 % 11 % 9 %
Car mechanics 13 % 9 % 7 %
Care workers 8 % 4 % 3 %
Commercial bank employees 18 % 11 % 10 %
Cooks 7 % 4 % 3 %
Electricians 7 % 4 % 3 %
Financial analysts and advisors 12 % 8 % 7 %
IT/software developer 17 % 11 % 10 %
Retail cashiers 4 % 2 % 1 %
Waitress and waiters 5 % 2 % 2 %
Source: Wolter and Joho, 2018 (Table 3, page 44); M1, M2 and M3 denote the different training models for which 
simulations were made. They are as in Table 1: M1 resembles the Swiss training model for youth who have attained lower-
secondary education and lasts 3 years; M2 is a two-year training program for youth with an upper-secondary qualification 
and M3 is an extension of M2 by one additional year of training. 
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It has become clear from the previous consideration of the returns on education for 
apprentices that such returns are not necessarily given in all cases in which the firms 
could carry out the training on a cost-neutral basis. In those cases, where the returns 
on education for apprentices are low, the reason almost always lies in the fact that skills 
premium, i.e. the additional income that can be expected thanks to training, is only slightly 
above the wage of an unskilled worker. There can be two reasons for this: On the one 
hand, it may be that these activities, although they require training, simply do not produce 
goods and services that generate profitability that allows higher wages. On the other hand, 
training may not be good enough for workers to produce goods and services so efficiently 
that a higher wage would be possible. For example, serving staff who are so poorly trained 
that they are so inefficient; the restaurant needs far too many staff for the customers, or 
staff whose services are so poor that the customers‘ willingness to pay for these services is 
minimized. 
The strategies to deal with these challenges depend on the two reasons for the insufficient 
skill premium mentioned above. In the first case, where it is an occupation that never 
generates enough added value for a necessary skill premium to be created, it is not suitable 
to be trained with much effort. That doesn‘t mean that one should not train this profession 
any more. However, it means that this profession should be either only the preliminary 
stage to a more demanding occupation, which you can only learn if you have learned the 
basic occupation first, or that you change the vocational concept so that the training already 
prepares apprentices for additional activities that generate a higher added value. If, for 
example, sales personnel are only trained for simple sales, then it will not be worthwhile for 
either the firm or the apprentice to spend a long time in training. However, if this training 
is the basis for a position in the middle management of a shopping centre, then it can be 
worthwhile for both. The apprentice can significantly increase his wage prospects and 
the training firm can find candidates for middle management who they could not recruit 
on the external labour market, or only at higher costs. For the firms with apprenticeship 
programs, the possible net costs of training are justified by substantially increased savings 
in recruiting – not of salespeople, but of people qualified for middle management.
If, on the other hand, the lack of skills premium is simply a consequence of poor training, 
then a potential training firm must consider whether and to what extent better training 
could increase the productivity of employees or the willingness of customers to pay. In 
other words: the firm must find out if a price increase is possible without having to fear 
that customers would defect to their competitors. If this additional investment in training 
is worthwhile, it does not always automatically have a positive effect on the net costs of 
training. Of course, better training can only be guaranteed by better training personnel, 
which is more expensive, and in addition, the training periods are likely to be longer, which 
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in turn reduces the time during which the apprentice works productively. However, these 
increased costs and declining earnings are potentially offset by a significant increase in 
benefits, which compensate for the additional investment during the apprenticeship. 
Apprentices who are better trained will already show a higher labour productivity during the 
apprenticeship and in addition one must consider that they now take the place of skilled 
workers who would get a higher wage because of their better training, i.e. the apprentices 
substitute more expensive skilled workers and thus create more benefits for the firm. 
Finally, it can even be assumed that a training firm that can reliably prove that it offers 
good training quality will find better apprenticeship candidates at the same or even lower 
wages. The reason for this is that talented potential apprentices realize that, while they 
suffer a short-term loss of income compared to a poor-quality apprenticeship with a higher 
apprentice wage, they have greatly improved prospects of a better wage during the rest of 
their working life, which more than compensates for this loss of income.
SEVENTH LESSON  The definition of the scope of training and the training quality are 
key for creating a win-win situation for firms and apprentices in most cases. 
Improvements in training quality and enlargements of the scope of training are often only 
seen as increasing the net costs of training in the short run, and as difficult to compensate 
for in the long run. However, there are good arguments within the existing context of the 
cost and benefit calculation models that show that these measures may not necessarily lead 
to higher net training costs during the apprenticeship. High-quality training that prepares 
apprentices not only for the occupation, but for higher level jobs leads to a more balanced 
combination of lower net training costs , higher saved hiring costs and higher rates of return 
on education for apprentices. Especially when compared to a combination of lower – but still 
net costs of training, low to non-existent savings in hiring costs together with low returns on 
education for apprentices.
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